How France works
One tax break, evaluated here
Whether exempting firms from profit tax in the rural revitalisation zones creates jobs in the low-density, low-income communes the zone targets.
Rural revitalisation zones (ZRR) exempt firms in poor rural communes from profit tax, at a cost of in 2024. This page asks whether the communes that entered the zones in 2017 gained jobs, compared with matched communes that never entered. By 2025 their private jobs had changed by : no gain, and a fall at the edge of what the comparison can separate from drift between the communes.
Evidence
Rural revitalisation zones (ZRR) exempt firms set up in poor rural communes from profit tax: in 2024. The questions are whether they created jobs and whether those jobs outlast the exemption. This page answers with the method the Cambridge Centre for Carbon Credits uses to judge whether a forest project saved trees, with communes in place of forest pixels.
- Additionality. Each commune that entered ZRR in 2017 is paired with a never-classified commune of the same region with the same private jobs and tax households in 2006, 2011 and 2016, the same income per household in 2011 and 2016, the same number of employers, and the same balance of births and deaths since 2008, each within a set tolerance of the entrant's own values. Pairs are drawn 100 times; only draws where the two groups are balanced on all ten count.
- Placebo. The same comparison with a fake start in 2011, before anything happened: it should find nothing.
- Leakage. Unclassified communes within 10 km of an entrant: did jobs move next door, or away from it?
- Permanence. Communes that lost ZRR status in 2017, their benefits running out in 2020-2023, against matched communes that kept it, to see whether jobs fall when the support stops.
Additionality: communes entering ZRR in 2017
3,380 communes treated · 56 pairs per draw · 94 of 100 draws balanced
Placebo: the same communes, fake start in 2011
3,384 communes treated · 93 pairs per draw · 97 of 100 draws balanced
Leakage: their unclassified neighbours
2,321 communes treated · 81 pairs per draw · 100 of 100 draws balanced
Permanence: communes leaving ZRR in 2017
3,742 communes treated · 149 pairs per draw · 100 of 100 draws balanced
Show the data as a table
| Year | Additionality: communes entering ZRR in 2017 | Placebo: the same communes, fake start in 2011 | Leakage: their unclassified neighbours | Permanence: communes leaving ZRR in 2017 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2006 | +1.8% | +2.2% | +2.7% | -0.5% |
| 2007 | +3.9% | +0.4% | +1.4% | -0.2% |
| 2008 | +3.5% | +1.8% | +1.7% | -0.8% |
| 2009 | +2.6% | +2.5% | +1.7% | -0.5% |
| 2010 | +3.2% | +3.9% | +3.0% | +0.2% |
| 2011 | -1.1% | +0.0% | +1.8% | +0.1% |
| 2012 | -0.6% | +0.1% | +1.4% | -0.1% |
| 2013 | -1.7% | +1.6% | +0.4% | -1.5% |
| 2014 | -2.6% | +1.7% | +0.9% | -0.5% |
| 2015 | -0.5% | +2.2% | +1.9% | +1.8% |
| 2016 | +0.0% | +2.3% | +0.0% | +0.0% |
| 2017 | +0.2% | – | +1.1% | -2.2% |
| 2018 | +0.6% | – | +0.9% | +0.4% |
| 2019 | -1.2% | – | +0.5% | +1.1% |
| 2020 | -2.0% | – | +0.7% | +1.5% |
| 2021 | -4.1% | – | -1.3% | +2.4% |
| 2022 | -6.3% | – | -0.3% | +4.0% |
| 2023 | -6.5% | – | +1.9% | +5.0% |
| 2024 | -6.4% | – | +2.7% | +5.3% |
| 2025 | -7.4% | – | +2.2% | +2.8% |
By 2025, employment in the entrants had changed by relative to their matched communes, employers by , tax households by and income per household by . None of these is a gain; the falls in jobs and employers are just distinguishable from zero at 95%, but in the years between those the pairs were matched on, their jobs drifted apart by up to 4%, so they are better read as no gain than as a loss caused by the zone. With a fake start in 2011, the placebo finds for jobs. The exception is income, where the placebo finds : entrants were already growing poorer than their matches, as the 2017 rules classified areas on low income, so the income result says little about the zone. Neighbours show in jobs, which cannot be distinguished from zero: no displacement can be seen. Communes that lost the status show in jobs against communes that kept it; the 95% interval excludes a loss of more than 2%, consistent with no measured job gain while in the zone.
Show the data as a table
| Outcome | Design | Year | Estimate | 95% range |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Private-sector jobs | Additionality: communes entering ZRR in 2017 | 2025 | -7.4% | -14.5% to -0.4% |
| Private-sector jobs | Placebo: the same communes, fake start in 2011 | 2016 | +2.3% | -3.9% to +8.6% |
| Private-sector jobs | Leakage: their unclassified neighbours | 2025 | +2.2% | -3.1% to +7.5% |
| Private-sector jobs | Permanence: communes leaving ZRR in 2017 | 2025 | +2.8% | -2.0% to +7.7% |
| Employer establishments | Additionality: communes entering ZRR in 2017 | 2025 | -3.9% | -7.2% to -0.5% |
| Employer establishments | Placebo: the same communes, fake start in 2011 | 2016 | +0.5% | -2.5% to +3.6% |
| Employer establishments | Leakage: their unclassified neighbours | 2025 | -0.2% | -3.8% to +3.3% |
| Employer establishments | Permanence: communes leaving ZRR in 2017 | 2025 | +1.8% | -1.5% to +5.0% |
| Tax households | Additionality: communes entering ZRR in 2017 | 2024 | -0.2% | -1.4% to +1.1% |
| Tax households | Placebo: the same communes, fake start in 2011 | 2016 | -0.9% | -1.9% to +0.1% |
| Tax households | Leakage: their unclassified neighbours | 2024 | -0.9% | -2.1% to +0.2% |
| Tax households | Permanence: communes leaving ZRR in 2017 | 2024 | +0.6% | -0.5% to +1.8% |
| Income per household | Additionality: communes entering ZRR in 2017 | 2024 | -1.6% | -2.6% to -0.7% |
| Income per household | Placebo: the same communes, fake start in 2011 | 2016 | -2.0% | -2.6% to -1.3% |
| Income per household | Leakage: their unclassified neighbours | 2024 | -1.0% | -2.1% to +0.0% |
| Income per household | Permanence: communes leaving ZRR in 2017 | 2024 | +0.9% | +0.2% to +1.7% |
Just either side of the 2017 thresholds
Since July 2017 a commune is in the zone when its intercommunality (EPCI) is at or below two medians: 63 inhabitants per km² and €19,111 of median income per consumption unit. Among the EPCIs sparse enough to qualify, those just under the income threshold were classified and those just over were not, and little else should tell them apart. From 2016 to 2025, private jobs in the communes that entered the zone changed by against those just over the threshold, and from 2015 to 2021 their population by . Communes already in the zone that stayed in it, against those that left, show in jobs and in population. Every interval includes zero: at the threshold, as in the matched comparison, the zone made no difference that can be seen.
The density threshold cannot be used the same way: among the EPCIs it could classify, more sit just under it than just over, and not among the others, as if some of the intercommunalities drawn for 2017 had been drawn to qualify. The two criteria are rebuilt for each EPCI from the data available on 1 January 2017 and match the arrêté of 16 March 2017 for 1,240 of 1,244 EPCIs. The code is analysis/zrr_rdd.ml, and every estimate, at half and twice the bandwidth, with placebo thresholds and density tests, is in rdd.csv.
Behaghel, Lorenceau and Quantin (2015) also find no effect:
We find no impact of the program on employment and wages, pointing to the absence of labor demand response.Journal of Public Economics 125 (2015)
Studies of the urban free zones (ZFU) measured the same concepts without the names: activity displaced to neighbouring areas (Givord, Rathelot and Sillard, 2013), diverted within the same municipality (Mayer, Mayneris and Py, 2017), and early gains that fade (Givord, Quantin and Trevien, 2012).
Matching, additionality, leakage and the placebo test carry over from the carbon method as they are. Equivalent permanence needs additionality to discount, and a social value per unit; with no gain measured there is nothing to make permanent, so it is not computed. The bands are 95% confidence intervals, from standard errors clustered by département on both sides of each pair; the spread across matching draws, the uncertainty the carbon method reports, is wider and is given in each figure's panel. Shocks shared beyond a département would widen the intervals further. The code is analysis/zrr.ml, and every result is in results.csv.
Its own aims
Measured against what it was meant to do
Each aim as the scheme's own texts state it, quoted, then every outcome this site measured against it, with the same design as above: the matched comparison, or the synthetic control. Positive, negative and null results are listed alike. Where no open dataset covers an aim, the dataset it would need is named, with why it is not open. Before them, the article of law that founds the scheme, quoted from Légifrance or the parliamentary record with the dates its wording was in force; after them, the indicators the State set for the programme, as the State reports them, with their source: this site shows them but has not checked them.
In the law, or the nearest official text
Each aim as the founding text states it, with the article and the dates that wording was in force. Where an article states no aim, a line says so, and the aim is quoted from the nearest official text that states one: the bill's explanatory memorandum or impact study, a government instruction, or the programme's performance report.
Stronger, differentiated development policies in zones with geographic, economic or social handicaps
« Des politiques renforcées et différenciées de développement sont mises en oeuvre dans les zones caractérisées par des handicaps géographiques, économiques ou sociaux. »Loi n° 95-115 du 4 février 1995 d'orientation pour l'aménagement et le développement du territoire (JORFTEXT000000531809, NOR INTX9400057L), art. 42, premier alinéa, initial version, in force 1995-02-05 to 1996-11-15 (LEGIARTI000006340126); unchanged in every later version, including 2015-2020 (LEGIARTI000028651053) and since 2026-01-01 (LEGIARTI000053544661)
The statute that created the ZRR; the zones are named in point 2 of the same article.
The ZRR are the disadvantaged rural areas of low economic development that face particular difficulties
« 2. Les territoires ruraux de développement prioritaire recouvrent les zones défavorisées caractérisées par leur faible niveau de développement économique. Ils comprennent les zones de revitalisation rurale confrontées à des difficultés particulières. »Loi n° 95-115 du 4 février 1995 d'orientation pour l'aménagement et le développement du territoire (JORFTEXT000000531809, NOR INTX9400057L), art. 42, 2., in force 1995-02-05 to 2005-02-24 (LEGIARTI000006340126 to LEGIARTI000006340129); the second sentence was removed by loi n° 2005-157 du 23 février 2005, art. 2 (LEGIARTI000006340130, from 2005-02-24)
Over 2014-2017, the period the site evaluates, art. 42 keeps only the first sentence of point 2 and no longer names the ZRR, which CGI art. 1465 A defines alone.
Create the conditions for employment and wealth to grow, and reduce territorial inequalities
« Elle tend à créer les conditions favorables au développement de l'emploi et de la richesse nationale, notamment en renforçant la solidarité des entreprises avec leur territoire d'implantation, et à réduire les inégalités territoriales tout en préservant pour les générations futures les ressources disponibles ainsi que la qualité et la diversité des milieux naturels. »Loi n° 95-115 du 4 février 1995 d'orientation pour l'aménagement et le développement du territoire (JORFTEXT000000531809, NOR INTX9400057L), art. 1, deuxième alinéa, in force since 2010-12-18 (LEGIARTI000023244454, modified by loi n° 2010-1563 du 16 décembre 2010, art. 52)
The aim of the national policy of aménagement du territoire, of which the art. 42 zones are an instrument; it is not specific to the ZRR.
Code général des impôts, art. 1465 A, II, in force 2014-12-30 to 2016-01-01 (LEGIARTI000030061179); the same II is in force from 2014-01-01 to 2017-07-01 (LEGIARTI000028448069, LEGIARTI000030061179, LEGIARTI000031816238) states no aim: classification criteria (low density and population decline, decline of the working population, or a high share of farm jobs). States criteria, no aim. The criteria name what the zone answers to (depopulation, loss of working population); the aim is in loi n° 95-115 art. 42.
Code général des impôts, art. 1465 A, II, A, in force 2017-07-01 to 2018-01-01 (LEGIARTI000031822355), as rewritten by loi n° 2015-1786 du 29 décembre 2015 de finances rectificative pour 2015, art. 45 states no aim: classification by the EPCI's density and median income. States criteria, no aim. Art. 45 of the LFR 2015 itself states none either; its III only asks the Government for a report « relatif à l’impact du dispositif sur les territoires classés en zone de revitalisation rurale » before 1 July 2020.
Code général des impôts, art. 44 quindecies, I, in force 2019-01-01 to 2020-12-31 (LEGIARTI000038586351); current version modified by loi n° 2026-103 du 19 février 2026, art. 49 (LEGIARTI000053544871) states no aim: profit-tax exemption for firms created or taken over in a ZRR. States conditions, no aim; the aim is in loi n° 95-115 art. 42, and the fiche of tax expenditure 220104 in Voies et moyens tome II gives its finalité.
Support the economic development of rural territories more effectively, by merging the ZRR, BER and ZoRCoMiR into one zoning
« Les ZRR, les BER et les ZoRCoMiR souffrent aujourd’hui d’un manque de lisibilité et de cohérence. Ils doivent donc être harmonisés et rationalisés pour soutenir plus efficacement le développement économique des territoires ruraux. »Projet de loi de finances pour 2024, n° 1680 (16e législature), exposé des motifs de l'article 7; enacted as art. 73 of loi n° 2023-1322 du 29 décembre 2023 de finances pour 2024 (JORFTEXT000048727345, NOR ECOX2322957L), exposé des motifs de l'article 7, bill as tabled at the Assemblée nationale, 27 septembre 2023
Art. 73 of the LFI 2024 (JORFARTI000048727426) and CGI art. 44 quindecies A (version 2024-07-01 to 2025-02-16, LEGIARTI000049130324) state conditions only; the bill's exposé des motifs is the next official text.
Greater State support for the most vulnerable communes
« un niveau renforcé, dénommé France Ruralités Revitalisation « plus », ciblant les communes les plus vulnérables, pour lesquelles le soutien de l’État doit être accru, sélectionnées en fonction d’un indicateur synthétique de vulnérabilité. »Projet de loi de finances pour 2024, n° 1680 (16e législature), exposé des motifs de l'article 7; enacted as art. 73 of loi n° 2023-1322 du 29 décembre 2023 de finances pour 2024, exposé des motifs de l'article 7, bill as tabled at the Assemblée nationale, 27 septembre 2023
Art. 73 of the LFI 2024 states no aim, so the aim is quoted from the same bill's exposé des motifs.
Help certain geographical areas (rural areas)
« Finalité : Aider certains espaces géographiques (espaces ruraux) »Évaluation des voies et moyens, annexe au PLF 2026, tome II « Dépenses fiscales », fiche 220104, PLF 2026 (octobre 2025)
CGI art. 44 quindecies states conditions only; the Voies et moyens fiche is the State's official purpose for the tax expenditure, and it names programme 112 and the mission indicator on business creation in priority zones.
Support business creations and takeovers in struggling rural territories
« Finalité : Soutenir les créations et les reprises d’activité dans les territoires ruraux en difficulté »Évaluation des voies et moyens, annexe au PLF 2026, tome II « Dépenses fiscales », fiche 220109, PLF 2026 (octobre 2025)
CGI art. 44 quindecies A states conditions only; the fiche gives the purpose.
Favour business creation where the economic and social fabric is most degraded
« L’indicateur 1.1 vise à mettre en évidence la pertinence des zones prioritaires en vue d’y favoriser la création d’entreprises là où le tissu économique et social est particulièrement dégradé. »Rapport annuel de performances 2024, mission « Cohésion des territoires », programme 112 « Impulsion et coordination de la politique d'aménagement du territoire », objectif 1, indicateur 1.1, analyse des résultats, RAP 2024 (2025)
The State's own performance document states what the zones are for and measures it by the gap in business-creation rates; the indicator is MVA-7-1 in the RAP 2025, in the table of the State's indicators.
In the programme's texts
Develop rural territories
« Les zones de revitalisation rurale (ZRR) visent à aider le développement des territoires ruraux, principalement à travers des mesures fiscales et sociales. »Ministère de l'Égalité des territoires et du Logement, Réponse à la question écrite n° 10204 (14e législature), « zones de revitalisation rurale », Texte de la réponse, JO p. 3880 (copie : data/literature/aims/an-qe-14-10204.txt), 9 avril 2013
- Private-sector jobs: (95% interval -14.5 to -0.4).
- Employer establishments: (95% interval -7.2 to -0.5).
- Jobs at the place of work (census): (95% interval -4.1 to +0.6).
- Income per household: (95% interval -2.6 to -0.7).
- Land taken for economic activity, m² per household: (95% interval -1.7 to +9.9).
- Land taken for housing, m² per household: (95% interval -1.9 to +28.0).
Reverse the losses that qualify a commune: population and working residents
« Une commune est classée en ZRR dès lors qu'elle se situe dans un espace de faible densité, et qu'elle répond à l'un, au moins, des trois critères suivants : perte de population, perte d'actifs, fort taux d'actifs agricoles. »Ministère de l'Égalité des territoires et du Logement, Réponse à la question écrite n° 10204 (14e législature), « zones de revitalisation rurale », Texte de la réponse, JO p. 3880 (copie : data/literature/aims/an-qe-14-10204.txt), 9 avril 2013
- Population (census): (95% interval -2.3 to -0.5).
- Net migration, per 1,000 inhabitants: (95% interval -20.6 to -1.6).
- Labour force aged 15-64 (census): (95% interval -3.2 to -0.7).
- Tax households: (95% interval -1.4 to +1.1).
The State's own indicators
The indicators the State reports for the programme, with the latest value and the target as it prints them, the report and page they come from, and the open data that could measure each at this site's unit.
| Indicator | Latest value | Target | This site's measure | Source | Open data that could measure it |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| MVA-7-1, Mission Cohésion des territoires (programme 112)Ecart du taux de création d'entreprises dans les zones prioritaires d'aménagement du territoire par rapport à la moyenne nationale | -1,62025 | -2,42025 | points2024 | RAP 2025 (PLRG 2025), data.economie.gouv.fr, indicateur de mission, objectif MVA-7 « Soutenir la compétitivité et l'attractivité des territoires »; coded P112-1-1 in the RAP 2022 to 2024 and named as the indicator of tax expenditure 220104 in Voies et moyens tome II, PLF 2026 (« Mission Cohésion des territoires 7.1 »)RAP 2025 dataset, mission record MVA-7-1 (a mission indicator, with no programme code); exec 2024: -1,8; exec 2025: -1,6 (« cible atteinte »); cible 2025: -2,4; cible 2026 (PAP 2026, carried in the RAP 2025 dataset): -2,4. The RAP 2024 defines it as the gap between the creation rate in metropolitan communes zoned AFR or FRR (ZRR before 2024) and the national rate (copy: data/literature/law/rap-2024-p112.txt, PDF p. 174) | Insee Sirene (base Sirene des entreprises et de leurs établissements, data.gouv.fr): creation date and commune of every establishment, so the creation rate can be formed by commune inside and outside the zone; this site already reads Sirene creations (data/places). |
The census outcomes compare 2021 with 2015, so they serve only designs that start in 2015-2017, and no placebo can be run on them; land taken comes from CEREMA's land-registry series, 2011-2024. The aims and their sources are in aims.csv, the texts of law in law.csv, the State's indicators in indicators.csv, and this site's measures of them in measured.csv and, year by year, measured_series.csv.